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. ~ The funotion of the army of the United states 
is, to protect the country against all enemies- for-
eign and domestic. Everyone is cognizant of the ac-
complishments of the American foroes against its for-
eign e~emies; but there is another work, of equal im-
portance, fraught with as great a danger, which is 
too often overlooked- that is, th~ use of the army as 
an auxiliary'foroe to strengthen the arm of munici-
pal authority, in the suppression of riots and dis-
turbanoes; and to maintain order,' where for some 
reason or other, the municipal authority has bee~ un-
able to cope with the situation. Wars against foreign 
enemies are usually of very short duration, but the 
war against the disturbers.of the peace within the 
continental limits of the United states has. gone on 
1. from day to day. The Armistice was signed November 11, 
1'18 but hardly a day has passed since then but that 
somewhere in this country regular 1tr':bbllB were in 
some capacity or other helping in the maintenance of 
law and order. In the year July19l9-20, for instance 
1. Report Sec. War 1920. 
~119G 
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regulars were on duty practically every day of the 
year. It is important to note the variety of occasions 
which ca.lled for troQPs and the universality of the 
appeal for their use. There were btrikes, l.W.W. ac-
tivities, race riots and floods that called for regu-
lar troops; and to name but a few of the states whenoe 
the appeal came- there was Pennsylvania, Texas, Olda-
homa, Nebraska, Indiana, Washington, Montana and Geor-
gia. The whole history of the work of the regular army 
in the United States shows that although these last 
few years have been rather troublesome and have call-
ed for more than a due show of force the army has been 
doing such work since the earliest times. To those 
who have fallowed closely the activities of the mili-
tary establishment it is merely necessary to name a 
few of the memorable occasions where the army played 
a very important part- the San Francisco earthquake, 
the Chinese trOUbles and the strikes of 1877 and 1894. 
In a democratic country, as the United. states 
the military establ ishment is essentially "Q..nder the 
complete control of the civil authorities. To safe-
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guard the constitution and the people against any 
usurpation of power by the military authorities, cer-
tain well known and strictly defined limitations have 
been placed on its power. Appropriations for the arlDJ 
cover but two years. ~ state cannot maintain armed 
troops in time of peaoe. Sold1er~ are not to be quar-
tered 1n times of peaoe in the homes of citizens. Theee 
constitutional prinoiples and others, besides a great 
. 
many statutes, safeguard oivilian institutions against 
military oontrol. It stands to reason therefore that 
oalling for military aid on the part of municipal 
authority is an admission of its own inability to 
handle a situation according to the usual normal pro-
oess. The use of troops by the federal government shows 
that its sheriffs, and its oivilian agenoies for exe-
cuting the laws of the country have failed to meet a 
orisis under their jurisdiction. 
The calling out of federal troops is a very 
grave and serious matter. The army is essentially 
based mn discipline and its aotion is prompt and 
summary- not necessarily arbitrary but it must essen-
tially bear of no delay. To call in the army is also 
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to call in its machinery and its mode of operation. 
Tbe army cannot afford to delay legal process by al-
lowing trial by jury when in "the face of a serious 
riot it becomes necessary to lock a man in jail with-
out trial and even refuse him the writ of habeas cor-
pus. Fortunately in dealing with civilians the army 
has been cautious to an extraordinary degree and if 
it lIlas ever erred at all, it has always made its mis-
. 
take to the advantage of the civilian. That does not 
alter the proposition that the army acts promptly and 
directly in the way to which it has accustomed itself 
by its training in field and barracks. In the last 
anal,sis it means that the ultimate modus operandi is 
martial law,when the military authority temporarily 
aSsumes command and administers the oivilian popula-
tion by the same rules that it does the military es-
tab11shment. To be sure, it has never been necessary 
to go to that extreme, but that is because the "necess-
ity" had not existed. Had the necesi:3ity arisen or should 
it arise, the military commander would have to take 
the responsibility of assuming full and complete author-
ity. There, too, is his dilemnaj if he does not use 
1. 
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sufficient force and the army fails to establish law 
and order by virtue of his negligence, he is sUbject 
to court-martial. Shou+d he employ more summary means-
or undue foroe- than are regarded as absolutely nec-
essary, the ci~i11an population or any individual may 
have him broug~t before a civilian tribunal with equal-
.ly dire consequences. It is, therefore, of the gravest 
importance for him to know the principles of martial 
law. 
Martial law has been defined as the "suspension 
of ordinary l~w and the temporary government of a coun-
2. try, or parts of it, by military tribunals". It should 
not be confused with military law, Which is the "legal 
system that regulates the government of the military 
establishment", and is covered in the court-martial 
manuals of the various countries. Too often, also, is 
martial law mistaken for military government. The latter 
is the law of hostile occupation, the military power 
exercised by a belligerent by virtue of aotual occupa-
tion of the territory over its territory and people. 
This lies in the realm of International law. Martial 
law, then, is a domestic fact and represents a relation-
1. Dicey- Law of Const. - 280 
2 .• Manual Court-Martial, War Department,' 1920, 
page 3. 
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ship between the civilian population of a nation and 
its own military establishment. 
The term martial law has been very odious to 
the Anglo-Saxon anci to his institutions. It hearkens 
back to earlier English History in the periods of the 
Tudors and stuarts, when English sovereign employed 
the army to further their own interests by rendering 
assistance against the pe~ple. To maintain peace at 
home, the King's prero~ative allowed him to call up-
on his troops whenever he deemed it necessary. He 
abused that power. Somehow to the Anglo-Saxon mind the 
phrase, martial law, has always meant the irresponsi-
ble power wielded by an autocratic ruler over his 
people by means of the army. 
stripped of its abuses, however, martial law 
at times not only becomes necessary to the welfare of 
the state but absolutely essential to its very exis-
tence. There are times in the life of every republican 
state when the lawless elements, mistaking license for 
liberty, take the laws in their own hands and a reign 
of anarchy is instituted, which rocks the very founda-
tion of the government. The time, then, is improper, 
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to say the least, to argue over the matter. Force must 
be met by force. It is the fundamental principle of a 
national existence for the state to repel the thrust 
at its very life. No government worthy of the name will 
allow itself to be overturned, its objects defeated and 
its inst~tutions destroyed in the face of such a cal-
amity. It will use the ordinary means at its disposal 
to counteract the attack, but if it cannot accomplish 
the work in the normal process it will appeal to the 
extraordinary- to the Qnwritten law of the state, if 
we care to call it such. How much force should be em-
ployed is a question; but just as much as is necessary 
to prevent the state from being overthrown. That ex-
traordinary force to answer the appeal is in the last 
resort, the military establishment and its operations 
must necessarily be carried on through a reign of mar-
tial law. 
It seems that all states realizing that such 
situations have arisen in the history of all nations, 
would have made adequate provision for the exigency 
of military control over civil affairs in their con-
stitutions and statutes; and this has been the custom 
dn the continent. It is the system employed in repub-
-8-
lican France. Provision is made for three conditions 
of society: the state of peace, the normal life; the 
state of war, and the state of siege, when in periods 
of distress the civil law i8 suspended temporarily 
and placed subordinate to the authority of the mili-
1. tary power. The state of siege in France can be es-
tablished ftby statute or if Parliament is not 1n 
session it can be made b~ the president; but in that 
case, in order to meet "the danger of a coup d'etat, 
which 1s ever present in the eyes of a Frenchman it 
is provided that the chambers shall meet as of right 
in two days. Within the district covered by the state 
of siege the military courts can be given criminal 
jurisdiction and can punish any offenses against the 
safety of the republic or the general peace. They can 
a.earch houses by day or night; expel from the districts 
any non-residents; seize all arms and forbi4 any pub-
Jications Which are liable to disturb the public or-
der." In places in a state of siege the authority with 
which the magistrates are clothed for the maintenance 
of order and police passes in its entirety to the com-
mander of troops, who exercises it or delegates to them 
1. A.L. Lowell- Govt. & Parties in Continental 
Europe Vol. 1, 63-64 
-9- / 
1. such part of it as he thinks proper. 
France, then, does not have the problem of mar-
t1al law. A state of siege 1s a well recognized con-
dition of society countenanced and carefully regulat-
ed by law. The relationship between the military and 
the civil is well defined - the military is in com-
plete control. Added to this is another factor which 
makes the handling of riots and disturbances a very 
easy matter for the French ao1dier, at least from a 
legal standpoint. Unlike the United states and Eng-
land, which are governed by the common law applica-
ble to all persons irrespective of their official 
position, France has a double system under its droit 
administratif - the "ordinary· courts and the "admin-
2. ist.rati ve u courts. Under the Freneh system "no ser-
vant of the government who without any malicious or 
corrupt motive, executes the orders of his superiors 
can be made civilly responsible for his conduct. He 
is exempted from the jurisdiction of the ordinary 
civil courts because he 1s engaged in an administra-
tive act; he is safe from official condemnation be-
cause the act complained of is done in pursuance of 
1. Decree National Assembly, Dec. 24, 1811 -
still in operation. 
2. Dicey 339. 
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his official duties.- He is thus exempt from giving 
an account of his act~ons to a civil tribunal even 
in times of peace. Consider then the power of what 
would correspond to our military commission operat-
ing under martial law- no amenability before a civi-
liantribunal during or after the siege, and complete 
power during the siege. The suspension of the law 
1. involved in the proclamation of a state of siege is 
fully recognized by th~ constitution. It has been 
said -that the authority of military courts during a 
state of siege is greater under the Republic than it 
was under the monarchy of Louis Phillippe. It If the 
Frenchman is unable to cope with riot or insurrection 
or oannot enforce the law when violence disturbs the 
machinery of his government, it .bonld not be the 
fault of the army. The power granted is complete. In 
time of siege Paris is in battle and the contending 
parties are the army on one side, the malcontents the 
other and the rules of the game are the laws of war. 
contrast this with the situation in a country 
like the United states or England. Martial law, as 
2. such, has not been proclaimed in England Since the 
1. Dicey 289 
2. Winthrop- Military Law 819 
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Revolution of 1688. The Riot Act, under which the 
military acting as aid of the civil authority, may 
attack mobs not duly dispersing is the chief legis-
lative act on which military interference is sanc-
tioned. By the common law, however, there is a deep-
er foundation for "martial" law. In England every 
subject whether a civilian or soldier, not only has 
1. the right but is as a matter of legal duty bound to 
assist in putting down breaches of the peace. "The 
degree of force which may lawfully be used in their 
suppression depends on the nature of each riot, for 
the force used must always be moderated and propor-
tioned to the circumstances of the case and the end 
to be attained •. The taking of life can only be justi-
fied by the necessity for protecting persons or proper-
ty, or by the necessity of dispersing a riotous crowd 
which is dangerous unless dispersed. • 
"Officers and soldiers are under no special 
privileges and subject to no special responsibilities 
as regards this principle of the law. A soldier for 
the purpose of establishing ciVil order is only a cit-
izen armed in a particular manner ..... To call for 
1. Dicey 460-464 
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assistance against rioters from these who can only 
interpose under grave conditions ought ........ be 
the last expedient of the civil authorities. But 
when the call for help is made and a necessity for 
assistance from the military has arisen, to re,fuse 
such assistance is in law a misdemeanor." 
"The whole action of the military, when once 
oalled, ought to be based on the principle of doing 
and doing without fear, ~hat whioh is absolutely 
necessary to prevent serious crime •••••••. No set of 
rules exists which governs every instance or defines 
beforehand every contingency that iliay arise. The ques-
tion whether on any occasion the moment has come for 
firing upon a mob of rioters depends •••.• on the nec-
essity of the case. Such firing to be lawful ....... 
must be necessary to stop or prevent ••••. w •• serious 
and violent crime •...• and it must be conducted with-
out recklessness or negligence. When the need is clear 
the soldier's duty is to fire with all reasonable cau-
tion, so as to produce no further injury than what is 
absolutely wanted for the purpose of protecting persOn 




" ..... The effect of the Riot Act is only to 
make the failure of a crowd to disperse for a whole 
hour after the proclamation has been read a felony; 
and on this ground to afford a statutory justifica-
tion for dispersing a felonious assemblage even at 
the risk of taking life.~ ••• No justification ••••• 
for firing can ••••• be rested on the provisions of 
the Riot Act itself ••••. The fact that an hour had 
not expired since its r~ading does not incapacitate 
the troops from acting when outrage had to be pre-
vented •••• The justification.~ •• must stand ar fall 
entirely by the common law. Was the act necessary and 
no more than was necessary to put a stop to or prevent 
feloIilious crime? In doing it, did the soldier exer-
cise all ordinary skill and caution so as to do no 
mere harm than could be reasonably avoided?" 
"If these two conditions are made out, the fact 
that innocent people have suffered does not involve 
the troops on legal responsibility ••• The soldier who 
fired has done nothing except what was his strict 16-
gal duty." 
Thus in England although a state of siege is 
---.----------------... ----.----.-.. -... .-
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not expressly provided for by law, the right to Fut 
the peorle iDto a. state of Siege by the establishment 
of martial law is sanctioned by the common law. The 
point of difference is that the soldier is his own 
guide. The mere. fact that hi s act ions were in further-
ance of martial law is no defense. The things he does 
that are necessary to establish order may be justified 
but in the last analysis it is a oourt and jury that 
will have the final say "as to whether his actions were 
justified or not.' 
Here is the other difference between martial 
law under common law and the state of siege under droit 
administratif. The fixed doctrine of English law is 
that a soldier, though a member of a standing army is 
subject to all the duties and liabilities of an ordin-
1. ary citizen. "Nothing in this act contained-, to quote 
the first Mutiny Aot, "shall extend or be construed 
to exempt any officer or soldier whatsoever from or-
dinary process of law.- A soldier is subject to the 
same criminal liability as a civil~an. The fundamen-
tal principle of French law, on the other hand, is 
that every kind of crime or offens.e committed by a 
1. Dicey - 296 
-15-
soldier or person subject to military law must be tried 
by a military tribunal. When an English, or for that 
matter an American soldier, is put on trial on charge 
of crime, obedienc~ to superior orders will not in it-
self be a defense. Thus even under martial law if a 
soldier fires upon a mob or uses more force than is 
necessary even though ordered by his superior officer 
to do so, he is still subject to trial and punishment. 
Consider the difficulty, then, of the British 
or American army officer on riot duty. Discipline is 
the most impor'tant element in a military establishment 
and is what distinguishes it from an armed mob. From 
the day a man enters the army he is grounded in the 
fundamental principle of unquestioning obedience to 
his superior. dQrders is orders' is a maxim known to 
every soldier. To shoot when ordered is expected of 
the soldier. To try him for obeying an order undermines, 
all discipline. No longer will he faithfully obey every 
order but he will reserve for himself the decision as 
to whether he thinks the order is a lawful one or not. 
Consider then what would be the plight of the soldier, 
who when summoned before a court martial for disobed-
ience of orders and refusal to shoot when directed, 
1. 
wou~d argue that he did not think the order was law-
ful and chose to disobey rather than pay later the 
penalty for having obeyed an illegal order. The Amer-
ican and British armies both have that factor to con-
sider in their admi~istration of martial law. 
The position of a soldier is curiously illustrat-
" ed by the following case. X was a sentinel on board 
the Achille when she Was paying off. The orders to 
him from the preceding sentinel were to keep off all 
boats, unless they had officers with uniforms on them 
or unless the officer on deck allowed them .to approach; 
'.w. 
and he received a musket, three blank cartridges and 
three balls. The boats pressed; upon which he called 
repeatedly to them to keep off; but one of them per-
ststed and came close under the Ship; and he then fired 
at a man Who was in the boat and killed him. It was put 
to the jury to find whether the sentinel did not fiBe 
under the mistaken impression that it was his duty; and 
they found that he did. But a case being reserved, the 
judges were unanimous that it was, nevertheless, murder. 
They thought it, however, a proper case for pardon; 
and further they were of the opinion that if the act 
1. Dicey- n-29? 
1. 
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had been necessary for the preservation of the ship 
as if the deceased had been stirring up a mutiny, the 
se~tinel would. have been justified.' 
The important point is that the jury decided 
in a ~iet and deliberate manner long after the act 
was committed when ~eace" had been restored whether 
the order in question was legal or not; and every 
soldier in performing his work must always remember 
. 
the possibility of his being brought before a civi-
1ian tribunal to answer for his acts. Placed in such 
a dilemna, what is from a legal point of view the duty 
of the soldier7 The following answer seems to be as 
near the correct reply as may be obtainable. It is an 
opinion of Mr. Justice Stephen. 
"I do not think that the question how far sup-
erior orders would justify soldiers or sailors in mak-
ing an attack upon civilians bas ever been brought be-
fore the courts of law in such a manner as to be fully 
considered and determined. Prooably upon such an ar-
gument it would be found that the order of a military 
superior would justify his inferiors in executing any 
1. Stephen, History Criminal Law of England 
Vol. I, 205-206 
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orden, which they might fairly suppose their super-
ior officer to have good reason for giving. Soldiers 
mi.ght reasonably think that the ir officer had good 
grounds for ordering them to fire into a disorderly 
crowd which to them might not appear to be at that 
moment engaged in acts of dangerous violence. b~t 
soldiers could hardly suppose that their officer 
could have any good grounds for ordering them to fire 
a volley down a crowded-street when no disturbance 
of any kind was either in progress or apprehended. 
The doctrine that a soldier is bound under all cir-
cumstances whatever to gbey his superior officer 
would be fatal to military discipline itself,: for 
it would justify the private in shooting the colon-
el by the orders of the captain or in deserting to 
the enemy 1nthe field of battle on the order af his 
immediate superior. I think it is not less monstrous 
to suppose that superior orders would justify a 
soldier in the massacre of unoffending civilians in 
time of peace, .or in the exercise of inhuman cruel-
ties~ such as the slaughter of women and children 
during a rebellion. The only line that presents 
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itself to my mind is taat a soldier should be pro-
tected by orders for which'he might reasonably be-
lieve his officer to have good grounds. The incon-
venience of being subjeot to two jurisdiotions, the 
sympathies of which are not unlikely to be opposed 
to each other, is an inevitable consequence of the 
double necessity of preserving on the one hand the 
supremacy of the law and on the other the discipline 
of the army." 
There is no getting away from the fact tbat the 
British and American soldiers are in a very delicate 
position in the performance of riot duty and they 
have to be the most "intelligent soldiers on earth". 
The right to pardon, possessed by all state and nation-
al exeoutive~1 and the Crown makes his lot a little 
easier for the remedy of nullifying an unjust convic-
tion for obedience to orders could always be used. 
Nevertheless the common law gives him no exemption 
from 1 iabili ty on the ground of obedience to orders 
per see They must be legal orders. 
Here we have then the differenoe between the 
continental and English schools. The French soldier 
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is supreme in a state of siege. Under the common law 
the civil law is always supreme. Necessity is the sole 
justification for any acts of violence. The English 
and American soldier must always answer before a civil 
tribunal; the French soldier is judged in his conduct 
purely by military standards before a military tribu-
nal. 
It would seem that the Anglo-Saxon soldier is 
at a decided disadvantage in dealing with riots or 
insurrections as compared to the continental soldier 
even of as democratic a country as France. Neverthe-
less it will be found that the American or British 
soldier has acted as promptly and as forcibly as was 
necessary and his actions have on the whole, stood 
the test before the civilian tribunal and have been 
upheld. Wherever force, more than was duly necessary, 
was employed the soldiers were rebuked and their ac-
tions nullified. A tlotable example of such a case in 
1. English history is to be found in the famous Wolfe 
Tone's case. 'In 1798 Wolfe Tone, an Irish rebel, took 
part in a French inVasion of Ireland. The man-of-war 
in which he sailed was captured and Wolfe Tone was 
1. Dicey- 289-90 
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brought to trial before a court-martial in Dublin. He 
was thereupon sentenced to be hanged. He held, however, 
no commission as an English officer, his only commission 
being one from the French republic. On the morning when 
his execution was about to take place application was 
made to the King's bench for a writ of habeas corpus. 
The gI"ound taken was that Wolfe Tone, not being a mili-
tary person was not subject to punishment by a court-
martial, or in effect that the officers who tried him 
were attempting illegally to enforce martial law. The 
Court of King's bench at once granted the writ. When 
it is remembered that Wolfe Tone's substantial guilt 
was admitted, that the court was filled with judges 
who detested the rebels, and that in 1798 Ireland was 
in the midst of a revolutionary crisiS, it will be 
admitted that no more splendid assertion of the suprem-
acy ofLhe law can be found than the protection of 
Wolfe Tone by the Irish bench.-
Granted that the average oourt will give the 
average soldier of officer a square deal when he is 
ca.lled before it to show that the force he employed 
was necessary and not in excess of the need, that the 
-22-
order be obeyed be bad every right to believe was 
lawful and just, what would his natural reaction be? 
Would he notoe likely to shirk repponsibility just 
a bit and be hesitant in his decisions thus undermin-
ing the most important essential of a good military 
leader? And what is to become of the overzealous sol-
dier, the one who in his anxiety to protect the public 
oversteps the legal bounds and does a bit more than 1s 
absolutely necessary, but yet not in culpable excess. 
the man who performs a moral duty, his motive being 
patriotic, unselfish and beneficial to the public, 
should he be considered a law breaker? If this were 
the case we would be discouraging a vital factor in 
the necessary makeup of all good and honest govern~nt 
employees. To protect him, therefore, England passes 
an Indemnity Act. To take an example of one of these 
nmoral" acts. SUppose there was a period of threaten-
ed invasion and an army officer without any legal 
authority arrests and imprisons on suspici.n a number 
of men who are regarded as disloyal by him,- he may 
be performing a moral duty, and if his suspiCions were 
well founded he may have performed a great public ser-
-23-
vice. Nevertheless he needs an Act of Indemnity to 
protect him. 
This, then, is the purpose of the Act of Inde~ 
nity not to legalize all military acts committed dur-
ing a rebellion, but only those committed through 
overzealousness which carried a moral obligation though 
not a legal one. Whatever else is done must be justi-
fied by the doctrine of necessity repognized by common 
law and ultimately settled by judge and jury. The beat 
thing about an indemnity act is that it works as a sort 
of vote of credit to the army,though legally it pro-
cures little or nothing that the common law does not 
already give. • 
II. 
So far wa have merely considered the aspects 
of martial law from an English point of view but what 
is true of England is in general,. true of the United 
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states. The law of the land is the English common law 
in both cases. In the American national and state con-
stitutions we often find written the terms martial law 
or its existence implied. The English constitution be-
ing unwritten recognizes the existence of martial law 
and even if we found no mention of it in the American 
constitution judges and juries would have to take 
cognizance of it by virtue of its existence under the 
common law. Having written references to it in our 
constitution particularly emphasizes its existence. 
The federal constitution provide. that the Iprivilege 
of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended 
unless when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion, the pub-
lic safety may require it". This implies clearly th~ 
there are times when the writ may be suspended; and a 
suspension of the guaranteed rights of the individual 
may olearly be an act of martial law. The Constitution 
gives Congress the power to provide for calling fortb 
the militia to exeoute the Laws of the Union, suppress 
insurrection and repel invasions, clearly providing 
for military interference in the civil life of the . 
American community. Furthermore we have the proviSion 
1. 
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that the .United states shall guarantee to every state 
in this Union a republican form of government and shall 
protect each of them against invasions and on applica-
tion of the Legislature or of the Executive (when the 
legislature cannot be convened) against domestic vio-
lence. • 
Thus we have clearly provided for martial law 
in the United states and under these constitutional 
provisions and similar ones, found in all state con-
stitutions, for civil appeal for military intervention. 
Whenever the question has come before the Sup.-
reme Court of the United States that judicial body has 
always recognized the right to establish martial law 
as existing for both federal and state governments. It 
has often declared itself against Bome particular act 
of a military.personin the execution of martial law 
but never against the principle. In one of the first 
cases to come before this tribunal, that of Luther VI 
Borden, the Supreme Court said in part: 'Unquestionably 
a state may use its military power to put down an armed 
insurrection too strong to be controlled by the ciVil 
authority. The power is essential to the existence of 
1. Luther vs Borden 7 Howard I, (1848) 
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every government, essential to the preservation of.pr-
der and free institutions. and as necessary to the 
states of this Union as to any other government. The 
state itself must determine what degree of foroe the 
orisis demands, and if, the government of Rhode Island 
deemed the armed opposition so formidable and so ram-
ified throughout the state as. to reqUire the use of 
its military foroe and the deolaration of martial law, 
we see no ground upon whioh the oourt can question its 
authority·. Occasionally we find some court which does 
not subscribe entirely to these tenets but these are 
exoeptional. 
As for the question of responSibility of sub-
ordinates for illegal orders executed in obedienoe to 
military superiors, Amerioan courts have handed down 
some interesting deoisions which in the main, uphold 
the common law dootrine. 
1. In the oase Commenwealth vs Blodgett, the Sup-
reme Oourt of Ma.ssachusetts said in part:. lilt has been 
argued upon the grounds of the evident hardships of 
the case that men oUSht not to be held responsible for 
acts done in obedience to order .. which they are oompell-
1. 10 Metoalf (MassachusBttS) Page 56 et Seq. 
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ed to obey under severe military discipline. But this 
is not the true principle and it would be dangerous 
in the extreme to oarry it out into its consequences. 
The more general and the sounder rule is that he who 
does aots injurious to the right of others oan exouse 
himself as against the party injured by pleading the 
lawful commands of a superior whom he is bound to 
obey. A man may be often so placed in civil life and 
more especially in militery life, as to be obliged to 
execute unlawful cOffimands on pain of severe legal con-
sequences. As against the party giving such command 
he will be justified; in foro conscientiae he may be 
excusable, but toward the party injured the act is done 
at [;is own peri 1 and he must stand responsible". 
Thus we find American and English law in accord. 
Both recognize the existence of martial law. Both hOld 
the subordinate responsible for obedience to unlawful 
orders. Both agree tha~ the necessity for martial law 
and the ex~ent of its operations are in the last analy-
sis decided by a coutt. 
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III. 
We now come to consider the operation of martial 
law. We find that although the theor~sof martial law 
in England and the United states are about the same, 
the circumstances under which martial law has been in-
stituted vary appreciably between the two countries. 
English cases of the last century are nearly all con-
fined to her colonies o~ Ireland, while most of our 
cases refer to continental United States. 
Our chief interest is in the operation of mar-
tial law in the United States. Passing briefly over 
the most prominent English examples will be sufficient 
to s,how that "peace does not always re ign in the. King's 
realm" - the s.cenes attending the seating of Mr. Wilkes 
1n Parliament in 1768, the Gordon riots of 1780, the 
Manchester riots of 1830 and the many examples in Ire-
1. land, particularly the experiences of 1920-21. Witness 
also its exercise in Jamaica in 1867, when 354 persons 
were put to death under sentence of court-martial and 
85 persons without trial; 600 persons, some of whom 
were women, were flogged and impris.oned and 1000 dwell-
------------------------.-----------------------------
1. Winthrop 819 
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ings were destroyed by burning- all by way of punish-
ment of alleged rebels and within a period of one 
month. Outside of placing tte governor of a colony in 
a situation analagous to a governor of a state in our 
country in reference to the power to declare martial 
law, English colonial experience offers nothing more 
of particular interest. 
We now come to a consideration of martial law 
1n the United states. We- are particularly interested 
in the cases of the last fifty years, or "he period 
when the United states has been emerging from an ag-
ricultural into an industrial state. These years also 
mark the great flood of foreign elements into this 
cou~trYJ which playa very important part in the labor 
and strike movements. Although most American cases 
involving the exercise of martial law are of relative-
ly recent origin, we find it exercised in the period 
of infancy of the American republic. Even before the 
1. Declaration of Independence in 1775 we find martial 
law in this country. In June of that year General 
Gage commanding the British forces declared martia.l 
2. law in Boston; and in November 0 f the same year Gov-
1. Bancroft, History of the United States, VII-392 
2. Bancroft, History of the United States, VIII-220 
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ernor Dunmore establishe.i martial law in Virginia. 
Our forefathers were highly sensitive about the ex-
ercise of martial law and they denounced the action 
in Boston as an "attempt to supersede the course of 
the common law and instead thereof, to publish and 
order the use of martial law". The Virginia assembly 
1. in equally vehement tone denounced Governor Dunmore's 
act as an "assumed power which the King, himself can-
not exercise; because it annuls the law of the land 
and introduces the most execrable of all systems, 
martial law". 
2. About ten years after Massachusetts had denounced 
the action of General Gage i~ was compelled to declare 
martial law o! its own accord, November 10, 1?86. The 
General Court (i.e. the legislature) suspended the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus at the same 
time empowering the governor and council· to bring about. 
the arrest and imprisonment without bail of anyone whom 
they considered dangerous to the Commonwealth. This 
took place during the famous Shay·s Rebellion. 
The first instance of the employment of federal 
troops enforcing the law we find in the Whiskey Insur-
1. Quoted in Ex Parte Milligan 4 Wallace 2 
2. Martin- Life of Artemas Ward 288 
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rection in Western Pennsylvania, 1794-5. No suspension 
1. 
of the writ was resorted to although insurgents were 
arrested by military authority. They were tried, how-
ever, by civil courts. There were several important 
precedents established by this case. The first question 
involved the power of the president to callout troops. 
Congress had passed an act February 28, 1795, authoriz-
ing the president under certain circumstances to call 
2. out the militia. The la~ was upheld by the courts, and 
the president was held to be the final judge of the 
emergency justifying such a call. Another precedent es-
tablished at this time was the formal proclamation of 
martial law. As a condition precedent ItO the emp1oy-
ment of military force the president is required now 
by proclamation "to command the insurgents to disperse 
and retire peaceably to their respective abodes with-
in a limited time". (Sec. 5300 Revised Statutes.) 
3. Legally the proclamation is not required. "The proclam-
ation of martial law does not, unless under some stat-
utory provision, add to the power or right inherent. 
in the government to uSee force for the repression of 
disorder, or for resistance to invasion. It does not 
1. Winthrop 828 
2. Martin vs Matt 12 Wheat 19 
3. Dicey 510 
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• 
confer upon the government any power which the govern-
ment would not have possesse~ without it. The object 
and effect of the proclamation can only be to give 
notice to the inhabitants of the place with regard to 
which martial law is proclaimed, of the course which 
the government is obliged to adopt for the purpose of 
defending the country or of restoring tranquility". 
In American practice r-roclamations have usually been 
issued. The instruction~ of President Washington to 
1. the troops are also very significant. He said in part: 
"Every officer and soldier will constantly bear in 
mind that he comes to support the laws and that it 
would be peculiarly unbecoming in him to be in any 
way the infractor of them;, that the essential princi-
ples ,of a free government confine the province of the 
military, when called forth on such occasions to two 
objects: first, to combat and subdue all who ~y be 
found in arms in opPosition to the national will and 
authority; secondly to aid and support the civil mag-
istrates in bringing offenders to justice. The dis-
pensation of this justice belongs to the civil magis-
trates, and let it ever be our pride and glory to 
leave the sacred deposit there inviolate." 
1. Irving, Life, of Washington V, Chapter 25 
IV. 
The first case to ooamand our attention from a 
military point of view involving the exeroise of author-
i ty upon the ini tiat i ve of a mili tary oommander to,ok 
plaoe in New Orleans in 1806. Burr's oonspiraoy whioh 
loomed up as a serious faotor, menaoing even the inte-
1. grity of the Union, was based cn the sentiment aroused 
in the West against the Federal Union. The most alar~ 
2. 
ing rumors had reached New, Orleans. General Wilkinson 
in command of the Western Department declared martial 
law. The militia waE placed under Wilkinson's command 
and numerous volunteers offered their servioes. Wilkin-
son who seemed to know all the machinations of the 
oonspiracy took the initiative in his own hands and 
employed the means at his disposal, that he regarded 
absolutely necessary for the safety and well being of 
the country. He placed under mi li tary arre st Dr. Boll-
man. Messers Swartout and Ogden, Burr's emissaries. 
Wilkinson's conneotions with the whole affair did not 
seem to be entirely above board and there is some 
evidence that Burr had expected his assis"ance. Modern 
1. Randall III, 174-189 
2. Fiske, American Diplomacy 147-8. 
historians have accused him of even receiving a bribe 
from Spain to betray Burr. Anyway, he arrested the 
men in question, who had been act.iog for Burr. Boll-
man was immediately brought before a judge of the 
Superior Court by a writ of habeas corpus and Wilkin-
son returned to the writ that what he had done had 
been necessary for the safety of New Orleans, and 
that he would continue to arres.t dangerous persons. 
Other arrests took place and some very sharp contests 
developed between the military commander and the me.-
bers of the judiciary .. In one instance, he confined 
not only the counsel for the prisoner but the judge 
who issued the process. His performance was neverthe-
less upheld by the Chief Executive, for President 
Thomas Jefferson, as soon as the news. reached him, 
issued a proclamation directing the employment of the 
regulars and militia to sieze every man and thing 
connected with Burr's conspiracy. The Senate too, be-
came hysterical and one of its first acts after con-
vening in 1807 was to pass a bill suspending 'the op-
eration of the writ of habeas corpus for three months 
in cases of arrest for treason or for other acts en-
dangering the peace or neutrality of the United states". 
The House rejected it. Bollman and Swartout, the accus-
ed conspirators, had been sent to Washington to be tried 
before the SUpreme Court of the United states. Chief 
1. Justice Marshall discharged them on a writ of habeas 
corpus. In passing upon this question Chief Justice 
Marshall expressed incidentally the opinion that the 
suspension of the writ was a power to be exercised by 
the legislature. This dietum led to a great deal of 
discussion during the period of the Civil War. Thus 
in the first exercise of discretionary power the mili-
tary received somewhat of a rebuff. General Wilkinson 
had, it seemed, overstepped the bounds of absolute 
necessity when he in fc..ct suspended tr.e writ of tabeas 
c or pus. 
About teb years later a similar drama was play-
ed in the city of New Orleans with different characters. 
2. Major General Pakenham in command of the British force 
had been threatening to capture the city of New Orleans. 
General Jackson did not ha.ve sufficient troops to de-
fend the city, and he issued the following order - "All 
able-bodied men, of whatever race, color, rank or con-
1. Ex Parte Bollman & Swartout 4 Cranch 100 
2. Winthrop 822 
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dition are compelled to serve either as soldiers or 
sailors". The situation was indeed a critical one, 
particularly since the city of New Orleans contained 
a large foreign element, principally French, who were 
not in entire accord with Jackson. On March 16, 1814, 
he issued the following proclamation~ - "Major Gener-
al Jackson cornijlanding the seventh U.S. Military dis-
trict declares the city and environs of New Orleans 
under strict martial law, and orders that in the 
future the following rules will be rigidly enforced, 
viz~ Every individual entering the city will report 
to the adjutant generalis office and on failure to, 
be arrested and held for examination. No person shall 
be permi~ted to leave the city without permission in 
writing, signed by the general or one of his staff. 
No vessels, boats or other craft will be permit~ed to 
leave New Orleans or Bayou st. John without a passport 
in writing from the general or one of his staff or 
the commander of the naval forces of the United states 
at this station. The street lamps shall be extinguish-
ed at the hour of nine at night after which t±me per-
sons of every description found in the streets or not 
at their respective homes without permission in w~1t­
ing as aforesaid and not having the countersign shall 
1. be apprehended as spies and" held for examination n. 
2. 
In the face of an impending crisis General 
Jackson had daclared martial law and as long as the 
British forces were at the gates of the city his power 
or authority seems never to have been questioned by 
the civilian population. The necessity for extreme 
measures existed and wa~ recognized. January 19 the 
British retreated to their fleet. To many of the civ-
ilians it seemed as though the crisis had passed. To 
be sure they possessed no expert knowledge, such as 
wa:3 available to the military commander. The official 
news that peace had been declared did not reach New 
Orleans until March 13 and it was during this interim 
between January 19 and March 13 that the clash be-
tween the military and civilian authorities took place. 
Rumors of peace had been floating in the at-
mosphere of New Orleans from the day the Britleh fleet 
had departed. Many of the soldiers impressed for the 
emergency were anxious to be released from the military 
service. One Livingston, aide to General Jackson, re-
1. Parton Life of Jackson 
,~ 
~. Parton - Life of Jackson 240-8 
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turned to New Orleans after a trip to the British fleet 
under a truce with the news of peace, February 19. The 
tro.ops expected the ir release at thi s time but the re-
port was merely a newspaper clipping, which, of course 
CQuld have no bearing on Jackson's attitude. He had no 
reason to believe that it was not a clever ruse on 
the part of the British to spread dissension in his 
ranks. From a military point of view, he might have been 
severely reprimanded fo~ the premature discharges of 
the only men he had at his dispos.al. Jackson attempt-
ed to vindicate his actions by proclamation but the city 
became even more infuriated at him. The Louisiana 
Gazette, on February 21, published a news item to the 
effect that peace had been announced. Jackson prepared 
an official contradict ion which the same paper was or-
dered to publish, but it had no effect on the prevailing 
sentiment. 
At this staae some of the French troops hit upon 
an expedient to escape from the service by claiming the 
protection of the French consul. Foreign as well as 
naturalized Frenchmen plead the same exemption. Jackson, 
thereupon ordered the consul and all Frenchmen who were 
-"'.,-
not citizens, to leave New Orleans in three days and 
not to return within one hundred and twenty miles of 
the city until the news of the ratification of the 
treaty of peace was officially published. Jackson con-
suited the regi~ter of voters of the last election and 
insisted upon holding those Frenchmen who voted, as 
"fellow-c itizens n .• and they were compelled to remain 
with the colors until the emergency was over. 
The Louisiana Courier printed an article by 
- ----
Louis Louaillier, a citizen and ~ember of the legis-
lature, which remonstrated against the order banish-
ing the French population from the city. General Jack-
son arrested and confined Louaillier. When Judge Hall 
of the U.S. district court granted a writ of habeas 
corpus directing the General to bring the prisoner be-
fore the court to be dealt with in the legal manner, 
General Jackson arrested and confined the judge for a 
week. Louiallier was charged with mutiny and libel 
among other charges and his case was to come up before 
a court martial. The judge was accused of aiding and 
abetting the enemy in "my camp" - to quote the General. 
Other arrests followed, Jackson maintaining that every 
man in the city was a soldier and New Orleans a camp, 
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with him in command. 
Jackson had some reason to believe that peace 
had been declared but his information was still un-
official. On Barch 11 he ba::1ished Judge Hall from the 
city and had him freed. March 13 came the official 
anno'.lncement of peace. Louaillier was set free and 
Judge Hall returned. The troops were discharged. The 
judge ordered the General before the court, adjudged 
him guilty of contempt, "and fined him one thousand 
dollars, which Jackson paid. 
General Jackson evidently was not greatly 
perturbed over the rebuke he received from the Louis-
iana COQrt for in 1821 we find him disregarding a writ 
of habeas corpus again. This occurred in Florida and 
the General had refused to honor a wri t for the bene-
fit of Colonel Collava, the former Spanish Governor 
of Pensacola, whom he had arrested and confine'. (Par-
ton - Chapter XLV.) 
There was such divided feeling in New Orleans 
in reference to the General'saciministration of the 
City during this troublesome period that it is diffi-
cult to state whether he usurped any power or was 
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merely pursuing the necessary means to keep the army 
intact during the crisis. The test, of course, was 
met by the court. In this case, being up before the 
same judge whom he had banished, he probably did not 
receive the fair and unbiased verdict that the mili-
tary commander would have received under similar con-
ditions. An attempt was made to vindicate General 
Jackson by an act of Congress of February 16, 1844, 
nearly thirty years lat~r, by refunding him the fine 
with interest. The act passed, but it was based part-
1. lyon party lines. The senate pas~ed the act 28 to 2Oi. 
the House 158 to 28. 
With the exception of the famous Luther vs 
Borden decision handed down by the Supreme Court in 
1848, nothing of any importance in connection with 
the use of the military organization in maintaining 
peace in the Uni~Gd States took place until the Civil 
War. Outside of clearly defining the meaning of mar-
tial law in this case, which arose as a result of 
2. the Doerr rebellion in 1842, the Supreme Court held 
that a state may, when the public safety demands it, 
proclaim martial law within its own limits, without 
1. Parton - 317 
8. Luther vs Borden - 7 Howard 1 
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infringing upon the United states constitution by exer-
cising war powers delegated to Congress. 
v. 
We now come to the Civil War cases and we are 
concerned here primarily with the cases that developed 
in the states that remained in the Union. The exercise 
of martial law by the Confederate states over the 
seceding states is also of great importance, for it 
shows how a nation fighting for its: existence must em-
ploy extreme measures even in the case of its own cit-
izens. 
The first question that the Civil War gave rise 
to was the authority of the president to proclaim mar-
tial law independent of Congress. Chief Justice Marshall's 
opinion that the power was lodged in the legislature 
had never been questioned, and in the leading case of 
1. Ex Parte Merryman, Chief Justice Tanney held to the 
1. Tanney's Deeis,ions 246 
same opinion. The president, nevertheless, continued 
to proclaim martial law whenever he deemed it best 
for the welfare of the country. 
April 29, 1861, President Lincoln had suspend-
ed the writ of habeas corpus between Washington and 
Philadelphia, thus bringing Maryland under military 
rule. One Merryman 0 f 1",lary1and was arrested by mili-
tary authority and when Chief Justice Tanney called 
upon General Cad'l'Jallader.to deliver the prisoner he 
was refused. The question was brought before the 
Attorney General by the president and the President's 
power to declare martial law and suspend the writ was 
1. upheld, which Chief Justice Tanney denied. In 1862 
President Lincoln su·Spended the writ in the District 
of Columbia, and othe:c parts of the country for men 
who were rebels, insurgents, alders or abettors of 
the same in the United states, those discouraging 
enlistments, resisting the draft, aiding the enemy 
and subjected them to martial law. On september 1.5, 
1863 a proclamation was issued extending the sus-
pension to all persons so engaged anywhere in the 
country. In 1864 the president made a similar pro-
1. Carpenter Military Government Southern Territory, 
American Historical Assn. 1900, Vol. 1 
471-498. 
clamation in the case of KentuckYt This power of arrest 
was first exercised by the state department alone, then 
concurrently wi th the War De partment and finally by the 
latter exclusively. 
The first case of bloodshed and one of the most 
interesting deve10pments in the administration of mil-
1. itary power over a "loya111 civilian population took 
place in Baltimore. As early as March 18, 1861, the 
Confederacy had opened a"recruiting station in the city 
2 ... and many men were obtained for the South" April 19, 
1861, the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment armed with rifles 
was passing through Baltimore enroute to Washington and 
was violently attacked by a mob, The mob'was first to 
fire and one soldier in the ranks was killed by a pis-
tol shot. The order to fire was given the troops and 
3. it was executed. Four soldiers, many members of the mob 
and one innocent on-looker were killed. The mayor of 
the city placed himself at the head of the column and 
begged Captain Follansbee in command of the company 
not to fire any more. In spite of his exhortations to 
the mob the firing continued into the ranks and finally 
1. R.R. Series 1, Vol. 1, page 276 
2. Rhodes III, 362-5 
'7, R.R. Series,)', Vol. II, page 7 ...,. 
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the exasperated mayor seized a soldier's musket him-
self and killed a man. The soldiers then fought their 
way through the mob and finally reached the Baltimore 
and Ohio depot where they took the train to Washing-
ton. 
Immediately after this attack Butler was 
apPointed to command the city and the neighborhood. 
This territory was under martial law by the president's 
proclamation of April 29, and the army was therefore . 
in control. When General Banks to')k command he appoint-
ed a provost marshal for the state and made all police 
officers subordinate to him. The result was that the 
police commissioners of the city ordered the disband-
ment of their force. The commissioners were then ar-
rested and a new force established. September 12 an 
order Was issued for the arrest of all members of the 
legislature who were suspected of sympathy with the 
South. 
The trouble between the army and the police 
came up over the question of arms. General Banks ac-
cused the police of not only having full cognizance 
of the stores of hidden ammunition but of protecting 
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1. those engaged in their distribution. Police headquart-
era was virtually an arsenal. In defense of the pOlice 
commissioners it must be said that arms were needed 
for their own purposes and without them the mob might 
have proved more than a match for the Massachusetts 
Regiment, that passed through in April. The General 
promised not to interfere with the municipal govern-
ment any more than absolu~ely necessary. 
In Missouri we find a parallel situation. 
Divided sympathies betwe~n the North and ~outh with-
in the state required strength and energy to prevent 
it from partly aiding the Confederacy or deserting 
2. the federal cause entirely. On July 31, 1861, Gener-
al Pope gave orders that every county seat and town 
of any size in Northern Mi ssourt" would be visi ted by 
a military force and in each a responsible committee 
of public safety was to be appointed. These bodies 
were to maintain p.ace and order and if they were un-
able too do so the military forces would take complete 
charge and administer the service at the expense of 
the county. 
Disorder was rtfe in Missouri and in the mid-
~. st of uncertainties General Fremont declared martial 
1. R.R. Series,l, Vol. 2, page 141 
2. Carpenter 474 
3. Carpenter 474 
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law-A.ugust 31, 1861, in these terms: "Circumstances in 
my judgment of sufficient urgency render it necessary 
that the commanding General of this department should 
assume the administrative powers of the state ••••••.• 
The object of this declarat ion is to place in the hands 
of the military authorities the power to give instant 
effect to the existing laws and to supply such defi-
ciencies as the condition of war demands.' 
This order was issned upon the general's own 
initiative and meant that in all cases the military 
1. commander would really be the ultimate judge. August 
30 Fremont issued from his headquarters at st. Louis 
a.. proclamation confiscating the property of all per-
sons in the state ••.•• "who shall take up arms again~ 
st the United states or who shall be directly proven 
to have taken an active part with their enemies in 
the field and decl&ring their slaves free men lt • He then 
f:let up a bureau of abolition and issued deeds of manu-
mission to slaves. President Lincoln revoked the re-
ferences to freeing of the slaves. Here we note a 
check upon the arbitrary powe~ of a military commander, 
which is too often overlooked- his responsibility to 
1. Carpente~ 4?5 
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his superior. The military commander not only has the 
lik11hoad of being brought before a civilian tribunal 
after the exigency has passed but of being taken to 
account by his superior at any moment. 
The military authorities were in a constant 
struggle with the civilian population of the state over 
1. the question of freedom of the press. On January 9, 
1862, the provost marshal ordered all newspapers in 
Missouri, st, Louis excep:ed, to furnish him a daily 
copy for inspection upon pain of having their papers 
suppressed. A strict censorship of the press was un-
dertaken. The War Bulletin and the ~ssourian, pub-
lished in st. Louis, were suppressed for making false 
statements about military movements. May 11 the sale 
or distribution of the New York Freeman's Journal and 
the Caucasian, the Columbu~ Crisis, Chicago Times and 
Daily Herald was prohibited. 
People were forbidden to move cut of the county 
without a. permit, ministers of the gospel were inter-
ered with, and property of all sorts was confiscated. 
At one time in St. Louis General Halleck ordered that 
the preSident, secretary, librarian, directors and other 
-------------------------------------------
1. Rhodes 111- 4?O 
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officers of the Mercant ile Library Associat ion; pre s-
ident, secretary and directors of the Chamber of Com-
merce should resign if they failed to take the oath 
and any attempt to exercise their office waS to be 
severly punished. The officers and professors of the 
state University received the same order. Mayors, 
judges and state officials were removed and others put 
in their places. Supervision was exercised over all 
courts. Dr. McPheeters, ~ clergyman was removed from 
his church because he had a rebel wife, rebel relations, 
and expressed rebel sentiments. The president and dir-
ectors of railroads in st. Louis had to file bonds that 
they would employ only Union men. An attempt was also 
made to control"labor's dictates to capitol. "No per-
son was to hang around or annoy employees, nor was any 
association to dictate to the proprietors" of certain 
factories. In October, 1864, it was declared that 
voting contrary to orders was a military offense. 
Kentucky's experiences were very similar to 
1 those of Maryland and Missouri. IIArrests were carried • 
to great lengths in 1864 when both civil and judicial 
officers including the Lieutenant Governor, the Chief 
1. Carpenter 4?6. 
1. 
Justice, together with the delegates to the Chicago 
convention were placed in confinement-. At Henderson, 
Kentucky, July 28, 1863, an order was issued ordering 
army officers to see that none but loyal persons either 
acted as election judges or voted, and that no disloJal 
person was a candidate. 
Thus far we have considered the operation of 
martial law during the Civil War in the border states 
contiguous to the field of operations and in the immed-. 
iate vicinity of the battlefield. Strict mea.sures had 
to be taken and the commanders did what they'deemed best 
for the welfare of the Union cause. Military authorities 
were mixed into civilian affairs in other parts of the 
North as well as in the border states. The most impor-
tant cases were found in Ohio and New York. The work of 
the army in the first Case is rather questionable but 
in New York the army was the 'factor that saved millions 
of dollars and probably thousands of lives. 
After General Burnside was assigned to command 
the Department of OhiO, he issued oQ April 13, 1863, his 
famous General Order 38, which said in part: "the habit 
of declaring sympathy for the enemy will not be allowed 
in this department •••. It is distinctly understood 
1. Rhodes IV, 246-250 
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• 
that treason, express or implied, will not be tolerated". 
Soon another order followed which said that the publioa-
tion and circulation of books containing sentiments of 
a disloyal tendency were to be considered in the same 
category. In May of this same year, Vallandigham, a mem-
ber of Congress who was a oandidate for state governor, 
made a speech at ut. Vernon, Ohio, oriticising the oourse 
of the administration. While there was nothing of a de-
finitely hostile nature in his speech it went as near 
giving aid and comfort to the rebellion as any talk 
CQ,uld that proceeded from a "good lawyer who knew the 
law·. General Burnside had two plain clothes men, army 
captains. in the crowd, who took notes on the speeoh. 
Their report to the General prompted him to send out a 
company of soldiers to bring Vallandigham to Cincinnati. 
They arrived in Mt. Vernon after midnight, forced their 
way into his house and carried our their orders. The 
General refused to recognize the writ of habeas corpua,: 
had Vallandigham tried by a military tribunal whioh 
found him guilty and sentenced him to close confinement 
for the duration of the war. The president approved 
Burnside'a action but commuted the sentence to banish-
men t from the Union and he was sent S,outh. This inc ident 
took place many miles from 'the roar of cannon amd 
field of battle and yet the action was justified as a 
mili tary necessity , although the doctrine established 
was overthrown by the Supreme Court in 1866 in the 
Milligan case. The justification for such an act is 
most clearly expressed in President Lincoln's own 
1. words: "Must I shoot a simple minded soldier boy who 
deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agi-
tator who induces him to desert? This is none the less 
injurious when effected by getting a father, or broth-
er or friend into a public meeting and then working 
upon his feelings till he is persuaded to write the 
seldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause for a 
wicked administration, too weak to arrest and punish 
him if he shall desert." 
In New York city i.t was the civilian popula.-
tion that cast the law aside and took matters into its 
2. own hands neeessi tat ing mili tary interference to in-
sure order and peace. the Conscription Act of Mareh 3, 
1863, began to operate in New York City July 11, and 
a riot broke out. The Objection to the draft seemed 
to have been caused by the clause allowing persons to 
1. Rhodes IV, 250 
2. Ibid, IV -324-8 
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get a substitute for $300. The poorer classes consist-
ing principally of foreigners objected to this dis-
crial.nation in favor of the rich, as $300 was quite a 
large amount at this time. There were very few troops 
in the city and this gave the lawless elements an op-
portunity to plunder and destroy property. A worse case 
of vandalism had never exhibited itself before in the 
history of the country. The anger of the mob directed 
itself not only to the ri~h but to the colored people-
the cause of it all. A race riot such as the south bever 
heard of followed. There was a great deal of bloodshed. 
The harbor defenses were stripped of practically all 
the soldiers and marines to quell the disturbance. The 
Seventh Regiment, New York's own which was in Maryland, 
was rushed back to the City. Troops arx'ived frebm Penn-
sylvania. For four days the soldiers fought the frenzied 
mob and finally peace was restored but not until the 
riot took its toll of about one thousand killed and 
wounded to say nothing of the destruction of property 
valued at over one and a half million dollars. Follow-
ing this affair ten thous.and infantrymen and three 
batteries of artillery were detached from the army of 
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the Potomac and stationed in New York city. 
Thus we find the Union exercising force whenever 
the situation demanded it. In time of war we must be a 
nation in arms and every individual a part of the darmy· 
whose hearty cooperation is necessary for the good of 
the cause •. 
The south, too, found it necessary to combat 
disloyalty in its own ranks, and Jefferson Davis and the 
Confederate Generalawere"on many occasions called up-
on to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and declare 
friendly territory under martial law. A letter from J.A. 
Campbell, the acting Secretary of War, in reference to 
declaration of martial law in Atlanta expresses the 
attitude of the South on the whole subject. This letter 
is written to Major General Samuel Jones dated October 
1. 27, 1862, at a time when the Southern prospects of vic-
tory were very bright. He said in part~ "the proclama-
tion of martial law in a locality implies that the diS-
trict is the seat of war or that it has or may soon fall 
within the lines of military operations or communication .. 
It implies that a more vigorous policy has become nec-
essary to preserve the efficiency of the army and to 
1. R.R. Series I, Vol. XVI, Part 11- 979 et seq. 
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maintain its discipline, to secure in all its fullness 
its energy and vigor for use against the enemy or it 
may imply that such an emergency has arisen as to re-
quire an extraordinary application of the resources of 
the population for their defense. 
The system of measures and administration which 
is introduced in such extraordinary and transitory ex-
igencies involving the public safety is perhaps inapt-
ly called martial law, for the measures and administra-
tion vary according to circumstances and are occasional 
and trans'ient in their operation as. to time and limited 
as to locality, seldom proceeding from the supreme 
power of the s.tate or affecting the consti tution of the 
body politic, not often necessarily impeding municipal 
administration. 
A City, the capitol of a state or nation, the 
depositorJ of its government and archives, the site of 
its workshops, arsenals, hospitals, magazines, and muni-
tions with an insufficient army for its defense, and a 
wavering population beleagured by a powerful and bitter 
enemy who could make its goods a booty and its house L 
desolation surely must be ,subject to conditions as to 
government and police dissimilar from that of a city 
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sheltered against danger from any quarter. 
These regulations not eXisting, but called for 
by such extraordinary circumstanoes find their author-
ity in this Confederacy in the oommission of the Exe-
cutive to use the military foroe of the nation to re-
pel invasions and adopt the measures requisite to em-
ploy this force with the utmost advantage for that 
end. In the fulfillment of this office he may not make 
unreasonable or vexatious searches and seizures nor . 
und91y restrain liberty or take life, but the same act 
may be reasonable at one time and under one class of 
circumstances and be vexatious and unlawful under 
another ••••• military administration- must have a lib-
eral extent ••••• In so far as it affects citizens who 
do not belong to the army it should be marked with so-
briety, discretion and deference for ,personal rights. 
The obje ... t. of the proclamation in Atlanta waS 
to secure the safety of the hospitals, public stores, 
railroad communications, the discipline of the troops 
in transitu and to collect deserters and absentees 
along the railroatii and guard aga.inst espionage on 
the part of the enemy ••••• Some regulation of that 
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unlimited freedom of intercourse and traffic which ex-
ists in time of peace has been round to be proper and 
some appropriation of private property for public use 
essential. " 
We need not concern ourselves with the cases 
that arose during the Union occupation of Confederate 
territory during the war as the South- s claim to belli-
gerent rights had been recognized and consequently the 
international law dealing with the occupation of enemy 
territory covers thoce CLoses. The Cases of the Recon-
struction period in many instances resemble the laws 
executed over conquered territory and not as a purely 
domestic affair, and we can readily pass over them. 
VI. 
The next landmark in the operation of martial 
law in the United States is to be found in the strikes 
of 1877. Before taking uf the strikes of 1877 let us 
consider two important incidents that took place in the 
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1. intervening ten years. In March, 1867, the Tennessee 
2. 
River overflowed in Chatanooga imperilling life and 
property and calling for ~nusual precautions for their 
protection. At the request of the civil authorities 
Captain J. Kline, 25th Infantry~ commanding the post 
placed the city under martial law and directed the seiz-
ure and use by the army of boats for the purpose of 
moving household goods. His actions were very praise-
wort.hy and he was commended by the mayor in these terms: 
"Martial law under ordinary circumstances is distasteful 
to a people inclined to the pursuits of civil life; but 
your action in this case must meet the commendation of 
all right thinki~lg people.' 
The other important incident of this period was 
the proclamation by the President on October 17, 1871, 
during the famous Ku Klux Klan disturbances suspending 
the writ of habeas corpus and virtually initiating 
martial law in certain counties in South Carolina. The 
moral effect of the mere presence of troops on this 
occasion, as well as in many others, proved sufficient 
!. to maintain order. For the year 1872 there was only one 
case of bloodshed and that was justified by a coronerts 
1. Winthrop 827 
2. Winthrop 828 
3.Report Sec. War 1872 
1. 
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jury. In all others the deputies had no trouble ar-
resting offenders. 
The use of the army in suppreSsing illicit 
distilleries Dccurred many times during this period. 
2. The army also found itself a humanitarian agency in 
3. 
assisting in the distribution of donati~ns for the 
residents of the Department of the Platte, who had 
become destitute because of the grasshopper ravages. 
The strikes of l877 afforded mapy lessons 
for the future military policy of the United states 
in handling internal troubles. At Martinsburg, West 
Virginia, the first act in this terrible drama was 
played. Following closely upon several years of great 
depression in the railroad circles due to severe cut-
throat competition between the varioua lines, an agree-
ment was reached among the road presidents in regard 
to rates and wages and the first step in this direc-
tion was a ten iarcent reduction in the wages of the 
empl«~yee s. 
The order reached Martinsburg July 16 and the 
firemen quit work. Soon they induced others to follow. 
No trains were allowed to pass. Freight was stopped. 
1. Report Sec. War 1874 
2. Ibid 1875 
3. Rhodes VIII, 18-51 
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The strike extended a~ong the railroad line. Pretty 
soon the strike became a riot. The Governor called 
out the whole military force of the state, which 
consisted of three volunteer companies, but they were 
unable to cope with the situation and the President 
was called upon for aid. The President issued the 
usual proclamation and then he sent 250 regulars to 
the scene. Their mere presence was sufficient to dia-
perse the rioters and ord~r was restored. 
This incident, however, did not end the troubles 
on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. Oumberland, Mary-
land, a station further west had a similar scene. The 
railroad company calle.d on the Governor of Maryland 
for aid. On July 20 he iss\1.ed a proclamation and mob-
ilized the Fifth and Sixth regiments. When the Fifth 
rei:iched the depot it was. a.ttacked by a mob. stones 
were thrown and shots fired into the ranks. The mob 
became very menacing and the Mayor of Baltimore sug-
gested to the Governor the inadvisability of sending 
any troops away at such a critica.l moment. 'The (lovern-
or then revoked his order. The Fifth failed to hold 
its own at the depot and Was on the point of being 
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overpowered by the mob when the governor sent three 
ccmpanies of the Sixth to its rescue. These companies 
no sooner left the armory when they were assailed and 
fired upon. They numbered but about one hundred and 
twenty while the mob consisted of about four thousand. 
The militia opened fire without orders a.nd continued 
firing, killing nine rioters and wounding seventeen 
others. The mob was now in a frenzy and assailed all 
persons in army uniform. ~any of the soldiers changed 
to civilian clothes to escape the mob. By the time the 
soldiers reached the depot their numbers had been 
greatly depleted. The mob then attempted to burn the 
depot. The police rushed to the protection of the mil-
itia. Incidentally the entire militia force of Mary-
land at that time was 725. The Governor called upon 
the President, and General Hancock was sent to Balt1-
1. more. It is interesting to not~ that artillery com-
panies formed the nucleus of Hancock's forces for or-
dinarily it is the infantry and cavalry that are al-
lotted such tasks. The presence of the regular troops 
brought the rioting to an end. 
The other center of trouble in 1877 was penn-
2. 8yl vania. Before taking up the. US.e of the army in 
1. Report Secretary of War 1877 
2. Report Secretary of War 1877 
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Pennsylvania, the following factors should be consid-
ered:. first, the entire regular army conf?isted 0 f 
24,501 men: second, detachments were employed to main-
tain order in Louisville, Newport Barracks, Indianapo-
lis, Jeffersonville, Galveston, st. LoUis, Chicago 
a.nd New York and other pla.ces besides those already 
mentioned, and third, that during the entire period 
1. the regular army was assailed by a mob but once and 
that in Johnstown, Pa. where there is eVidence that . 
it was made in ignorance of the identity of the nation-
al troops, and finally, that wherever the raaular 
troops appeared order was at once restored witbout 
2. bl.o·odshed and it was said, "that the rioters feared 
one federal bayonet· more than a whole company of 
militia-. President Hays in the review of the work 
_ 3. o,f the army during the year wrote in hi s diary~ "The 
riots- not a man shot but order promptly and firmly 
upheld." 
Incidents in Pennsylvania gave the state mil-
itia of 187? the ~aal test of its ability to main-
tain order in an emergency. The trOUbles in Pennsyl-
vania began in Pittsburg. The Pennsylvania Railroad 
1. Report Sec. War, Mc Crary 1877 
2. Rhodes VIII- 4' 
3. Ibid VIII- 47n 
• 
had made two reductions in the wages of its employees 
since the panio of 1873. A committee of engineers ~ad 
called upon Thomas A. Scott, the president of the 
railroad and were apparently convinced that a reduc-
tion was inevitable. The other trainmen:,were not so 
ready to acquiesce and were in a discontented mood 
when the company decided to run double headers. A double 
header means two locornoti ves, a langer train and the 
saving of an additional freight conductor, flagman and 
brakeman- seemi~gly a practical principle of economy~ 
This caused even greater dissatisfacti,on. When the 
8:40 A.M. train was ready to depart the two brakemen 
and flagman refused to go out on their double header. 
Other trainmen refused to take their Flaces. The dis-
patcher picked up a crew in the yard but they were 
prevented from making up the train by the strikers. 
The latter numbering but twenty-five to thirty took 
possession of the switches and as each train came in 
enlisted into its ranks the various freight crews. 
From this inauspicious beginning the strike 
spread to all railroad employees in Pittsburg. The 
Superintendent'sought police protection but the mayor, 
evidently sympathetiC toward the s,trikers, maintained 
that he had no men available. The Superintendent then 
enlisted a number of former policemen and took them 
to the station. On the way he was attacked. His efforts 
to get police protection were of no avail. 
He then sought the county sheriff, who find-
ing himself unable to handle the situation telegraph-
ed to the Governor for aid. The Governor was beyond 
the limits of the state but his Adjutant General or-
dered General Pearson; whose headquarters were in Pitts-
burg, to callout his troops and take command. The Gen-
eral ordered out three regiments and a battery. One 
regiment of 225 answered the call. The others assembled 
very slowly and it became very evident that their sym-
pathies were with the strikers. General Pearson call-
ed to Harrisburg for more help and Nation Guard troops 
from Philadelphia were sent to Pittsburg. Pearson's 
Pittsburg troops were aTl fraternizing with the strik-
era. 
The trip from Philadelphia to Pittsburg was 
badly managed and when the Philadelphians arrived they 
were hungry. Their fare for the entire trip had been 
coffee and sandwiches, served but twice on the whole 
trip. The Philadelphia troops, tired and hungry, were 
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immediately called into action. They marched to the 
28th street crossing where they found the Pittsburg 
militia fraternizing with the mob. They were orde~d 
not to fire except in self defens.e. The rj oters be-
gan to press thetr ranks and the troops formed a 
hollow square for defense. A bayonet charge wounded 
many of the mob and exasperated the rest, who beg,:.n. 
to throw missiles at the soldiers. Soon the mob fired 
into the ranks. Further ~mboldened, they tried to 
wrest tbe guns. from the soldiers. ~he soldiers began 
to fire Wittout orders an~ 1n spite of the officers' 
attempts to stop t.hem,. At least sixteen of the riot-
ers were instantly k.illed and many others wounded. 
The newspapers favoraiJle to the strikers denounced 
tt.e actions of the soldiers. 
The Philadelphia tro.ops bravely held ,th&ir 
ground but expected reinforcements never arrived. 
The Pittsburg militia had. dis.ppeared from the scene 
entirely- the struggle was now between the mob and 
the Philadelphia soldiers. About dusk the soldiers 
withdrew for rest and food to one of the round-houses. 
The house was 8,00n besieged. The troops were without 
food. The provisions, destined for them were seized 
by the mob. Volley atter volley .~a fired into the 
round-house. Finally the torch was aprlied. The sOld-
1. iers were passing through a terrible ordeal. "Tired, 
hungry, worn out, surrounded by a mob of infuriated 
men, yelling like demons, fire on nearly all sides 
of them, suffocated and blinded by smoke with no 
chance to rest and little knowledge of what efforts 
were being made for their relief, with orders not to 
fire on the mob unless in necessary self defense, the 
. 
wonder is that they were not totally demoralized; but 
the evidence of all the officers is that the men be-
haved like veterans." 
Tbe dregs of society were now in control of 
Pittsburg. It was a riot, no longer a strike. & reign 
of terror followed of fire, plunder and pillage. The 
troops finally abandoned the round~house and retreat-
ed suffering many caeualties. The riot died out of its 
own accord. Order was finally restored through the ac-
tion of the city authorities, civilian volunteers and 
a few of the loyal Pittsburg militia. The damage was 
over three million dollars .• 
The Governor returned at this time, called out 
1. Report of Oommittee of Pennsylvania Legisla-
ture appointed to investigate Riots 1877 
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the entire militia and appealed to'the president tor 
aid. He responded. Philadelphia was made the mobili-
zation point and General Hancock arrived there in 
person at the same time ordering G)ut the entire mili-
tary forces of the Atlantic. Governor Hartranft 
started from Philadeiphia to Pittsburg, gathered sold-
iers on the route and arrived in Pittsburg with 4000 
men. In addition Hancock ser.t dow!: 6CC l'cLula:cs. Tte 
riots in Pittsburg ended~ 
In Reading a similar performance took place-
the militia men attacked, firing into the mob, a reign 
of terror and the final culmination of the riot upon 
the appearance of regulars, - this time 200 in number. 
WilkeS-Barre, Scranton and Easton had Similar scenes. 
The riots of 1877 are the best arguments for 
a strong militia and the need of an efficient regular 
army large enough at least to handle similar situ~ 
tions. 
The year 1877 also witnessed a graat anti-
Chinese uprising in San francisco, but it is not un-
til 1886 that we get the use of troops to suppress 
these riots. 
1. The use of troops was further complicated 4ur-
ing the Chinese troubles by the fact that these up-
risings took place in a territory. In 1856 an upris-
ing had taken place in the territory of Washington and 
the Governor, a presidentail appointee, proclaimed 
and enforced martial law. The Governor's authority was 
questioned and the Attorney General's opinion denied 
the authority on the ground that the Governor, being 
an appointee of the President, had only those powera 
which statutes expressJ.y"gave him. It was admitted 
that occasions may arise in the history of a terri-
tory when it would become necessary to proclaim and 
enforce martial law, but in such cases the legisla-
ture alone had the martial law power. The opinion, Of 
course is legal but on the doctrine of necessity it 
is questionable whether there will always be an oppor-
tunity to call a session of the legislature. 
In 1885-6 Washington, still a territory, was 
the scene of illegal uprisings against the Chinese. 
Tacoma and Seattle were the cent.ers of hostility. Riot.-
ous assemblages became a common occurence. The rioters 
ware armed and defiant of the law. The militia was 
called but it failed to es.tablish order. The governor 
1. Berkhimer- Military Government 571-3 
1. 
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called for a posse comitatus but it, too failed to 
get the desired results. The pr.oclamation of the 
Governor to the mob to disperse was ignored. A con-
flict followed and several persons were killed. The 
Governor issued a second proclamation and then put 
Seattle under martial law. Before taking this step 
the Chief Justice and the United States attorney of 
~he Territory were consulted and they earnestly ad-
vised the measure. When the news reached the presi-
dent he not only approved but ordered General Gibbon 
to the scene. Two weeks later the proclamation was 
revoked. Provost Marshals had been appointed, the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspended in 
case of the rioters~ It had the necessary effect and 
peace and tranquility were restored~ 
In connection with the use of troops on this 
occasion a curious controversy arase between the Gen-
.. 
eral and the Secretary of War. As soon as Gibbon heard 
of the crisis he mObilized his forces ready to proceed 
to Seattle at a moment's notice. He was rebuked by 
the Adjutant General of the army in these terms: "The 
secretary of War thinks it would have been part of 
wj,sdom to keep s.ecret any contemplated movement of 
1. Report Secretary of War - 1877 
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troops, especially when connected with civil trouble". 
This took place February 9, 1886, and curious as it 
may sound, the very next day after the admonition Gen-
eral Gibbon was ordered to proceed to Seattle. Every-
thing became qUiet with the arrival of the regular, 
army. General Gibbon, however, suggested to Governor 
Squires, "that martial law is by your proclamation 
sti11 in existence and in my opinion advantage should 
be taken of it to arrest every known leader of the late 
outrages." Gibbon then proceeded to aid the Governor 
in this work. Here Gibbon, it seems, went beyond the 
authority conferred upon him and he promptly received 
another telegram from the Adjutant General in these 
terms: "The remark, in a telegram from the Governor 
of Washington Territory to the Secretary of War 'that 
arrests of leaders are being made by General Gibbon' 
creates the impression that you have not clearly com-
prehended the purpose for which the troops were sent 
to Seattle ••••• not as a posse comitatus •••• but to 
preserve peace and give security to life and property 
" ••• If the condition of affairs at Seattle or else-
where.~ •••• was such that the functions of the local 
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• 
judiciary were virtua.lly suspended by, acts of violence 
and the ordinary process could not issue ••.•. report. 
... should have been made, when orders if deemed nec-
essary would have been issued.' Gibbon's answer ex-
plained that he "was sent •..•• to aid civil authority 
and assist in the execution of the laws. The city be-
ing under martial law, the only civil authority ••• to 
aid was the governor." 
This important controversy between the mili-
tary commander and his chief brings out several salient 
!actsj first, the amenability of the soldier to his 
superior as a check upon the exercise of arbitrary 
power, and second, the dilemna of the soldier. He must 
look to his superiors for orders, be subject to re-
primand if he oversteps the bounds laid down by his 
chief, or be condemned for negligence if in the absence 
of instructions he fails to act. 
Durin~ this same year occurred a very serious 
uprising in the city of Chicago, when a bomb was thrown 
by an anarchist into a crowd, killing many policemen 
and civilians and injuring tp.any others •. The Chicago 
police force arose to the occasion and gave an excellent 
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account of itself, suppressing the riot without any 
assistance from any other source. 
1 
VII. 
The next troubl&some period in American History 
began about 1892 and since that time the regular army 
has been called on time and again to help maintain 
order in the United states. Most fortunately the state 
forces have been greatly strengthened since 1877 and 
the fraternizing with the mob, which became so con-
I. spicuous in the Pennsylvania troubles have become very 
few. General Schofield,in his annual report of 1892 
states, "that in all cases save two the National Guard 
had proved sufficient". This plrticu1ar year was mark-
ed by such famous struggles as the Homestead Riots in 
Pennsylvania, railroad strikes of switchmen in Buffalo 
and disturbances in Coal Creek, Tennessee caused by 
the use of convict labor in the mines. 
1. Report Secretary of War 1892 
1. 
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The first of the notable exceptions referred 
to by General Schofield took place in Wyoming when 
parties of citizens took up arms to settle their 
local differences. The second incident occurred in 
the famous Coeur d t Alene district, S~oshone County, 
Idaho, which has been on many occasions since then 
the· scene of mutinous riots and upris ings. The strug-
gle began be·tween the union and non-union men. Both 
were fully armed. The Miners Uni.on was well organized . 
and carried on a reign of terror. Winchester rifles 
and dynamite were freely used. On July 13 the Gover-
nor declared Shoshone County in a state of insurrec-
tion. July 15 the President issued his proclamation 
and sent federal troops to the scene. State troops 
were already there ... Their commander removed the sher-
iff and appointed another in his place and made other 
changes in the local administration. The influence of 
the regular army was purely moral and not ppyslcal. 
General Burgess in reporting the situation sais that 
-the mere appearance of the troops extinguished open 
lawlessness in the whole Coeur d' Alene mining region 
and no less of life became necessary in the execution 
1. Report secretary of War 1892 
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of duties devolving upon troops." 
A orisis in the American industrial situation 
in 1894 brought the regular army into the field as 
the most powerful law-enforcing agency in the country. 
A business depression followed by a finanoial crisia 
prompted the Pullman Palace Car Company to reduce the 
wages of its empl~yees, many of whom were members of 
the American Railway Union. The labor organizations. 
attempts at arbitration failed and a atr1ke was call~ . 
ed. The railroad men positively refused to handle 
Pullman cars. The strike spread allover the oountry 
but the chief struggle took place in the city of Chi-
cago. The strike quite naturally interfered with the 
national govern@ent since the United states mails . 
were usually carried on the fast trains to whioh PUll-
man cars were attached. In the meantime the strike had 
become a riot. The efficient Ch1cago police force 
which in 1886 quelled the anarchistic uprising at Hay-
market Square was probably through sympathy for the 
strikers,unable to handle the situation. The presi-
dent ordered 2000 regulars to Chioago. They arrived 
July 4 and even they were unable to quell the trouble 
at first. The mpb ignored the injunction of the United 
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states court, burned and destroyed railroad buildings 
and cars, and obstructed traffic on all of the twenty-
three railroads that passed through Chicago. Anarchy 
was threatened but instead of trying to quell the 
disturbance by the 100al police or getting any coop-
eration from the federal authorities we"find the gov-
ernor protesting against the use of regulars. The 
President, therefore, unable to send troops to Chica-
go under the constitutional clause prOViding for the 
use of the army upon application of the state author-
ities in case of domestic Violence, sent them of his 
own accord. This brought up a constitutional question 
which the courts decided in favor of the President. 
On July 8 the President issued a proclamation of 
warning and ample re-enforcements followed. The riot 
was checked. By July 20 peace had been restored and 
the federal troops were withdrawn. 
1. During this trouble Eugene V. Debs was arrest-
ed upon an indictment for complicity in tce obstruo-
tion of mails. A week later he was brought up for 
contempt 0 f court and hi s case) went to the Supreme 
Court on a writ of habeas corpus. The court upheld the 
1. In re Debs 158 U.S. Reports page 565 
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President. Since interstate commerce and transporta-
tion of mails are 1'ederal functions the United states 
government, the court held, is authorized to use the 
necessary means to prevent their obstruction. 
Although during this troublesome period all 
eyes were focused upon Chicago, very serious diffi-
1. culties had also developed on the Pacific Coast. Here 
the. country suffered because of the small size of 
the army. The Chicago strike had spread to Los Angeles . 
and Colonel Shafter appeared with troops to make pos-
sible the transcontinental service of mail and commerce. 
He was acting under orders from the president -to employ 
military force to remove obstructions to mails and in-
terruptions of interstate commerce on the Central Paci-
fic Railroad and just such protection as to insure to 
the government the use of such railroad for postal, 
military or other governmental purposes". The state 
t~ooPI called out to maintain order had ~ailed. Order 
was being established in Los Angeles when seriou. out-
breaks occured in Sacramento. In the latter, 1000 arm-
ed strikers held the situation in hand. General Rogers 
found that he did not have enough men to take care of 
1. Report Secretary of War 1895 
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the strike in both places so he asked for marines 
from Mare Island. His request brought a Battalion and 
these together with the soldiers established order. 
In the meantime the Departmant of Platte was being 
stripped of its soldiers to reinforce the Coast. In 
Sacramento a train had been derailed, killing four 
soldiers and the engineer. Before the marines. arriv-
ed the soldiers of Battery L, 5th Artillery had been 
scattered in small detachments along the railroad. 
Here the exceptional scene of missiles being thrown 
at the federal troops was witnessed and what is even 
more exceptional, firing of the troops themselves. 
They were attacked first however and the rigbt to 
defend themselves in such a case has never been ques-
tioned. The difficulties in California did not end 
wi th Sacramento., Oakland, an important ra-ilroad ter-
minal was next to succomb to the strike fever. With 
the small detachments of the army scattered through 
the whole state of California, and with marines in 
Sacramento there was only one p~tential military force 
left. General Rogers obtained the use of sailors and 
more mari~es and then organized them as infantry with 
gun detachments and gatling guns. The military forces 
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were victorious and with the exception of the one in-
cident 1n Sacramento there was no bloodshed nor even 
serious difficulty after the troops arrived. 
It is difficult to realize how mucD work the 
small force of regulars was called upon to perform 
l~ during this trying period. The Coxeyite troubles were 
2. 
causing great concern in the northwest- in Montana 
and also in the Department of Columbia. In the latter 
Coxey's army· stole a train to take them to Washington 
only to be intercepted by the regulars, The Pullman 
strikes caused many riots in these districts which 
were handled by the federal troops in the usual sat-
isfactory manner. 
A queer incident occurred in the Department 
of Colorado in this same year. An attempt was made in 
Denver by the Governor to use the federal troops for 
political purposes. He had attempted to seat two new 
members in the police and fire departments to wl:ich 
severe opposition had been aroused. Denver had been 
the scene of riots before and the situation assumed 
a serious aspect. The city contained a federal mint 
and depo si tory. The Governor asked for assistance from 




, General McCIook. The General tactfully refused the 
. 
Governor's request for assistance in taking the City 
H&ll from his political opponents. The presence of 
the troops however had the moral effect of breaking 
up the riot. 
The last conspicuous case of the nineteenth 
century involving the use of the regular army took 
place in the Coeur d' Alene region in 1899. The dif-. 
ficulties that arose in 1892 were far from settled 
. 
and the chronic trouble recurred over the ~ame ques-
tion of union and non-union labor. Governor Steunen-
berg, called to the scene of hostilities found the 
situation beyond bis control and reported that fact 
to Washington. The Adjutant General ordered Briga~ 
dier General Merriam of the Department of Colorado 
'to repair at once to the Capitol of the state and 
I 
after conference with the authorities, thence ••••• 
to the seat of action calling to yeur aid such troops 
;:;.s ILay be most convenient, regardless of department 
lines." The General immediately got in touch with 
the Governor and, after u~king a personal reconnais-
ance, accompanied by his aide, he issued orders for 
the immediate mobilization of troops in Shoshone 
1. Report Secretary of War 1899. 
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County. It was estimated that there were about one 
thousand armed miners who were acting in open defiance 
of the law and had already destroyed much mining prop-
erty and caused some bloodshed. The Governor seemed 
in doubt as to whether he should declare martial or 
not. He and the General had both agreed that the best 
way to break up tte rioting would be to scrutinize 
closely all travel and detain suspected passengers. 
This was clearly an ac~ under martial law and the Gen-
eral hesitated before taking the measure. He telegraph-
ed to Washington and re.cei ved ar_proval for tt:e suggest-
e,~ actio!'. The rioters learninc of tilE' t::.l'''Droach of the 
regulars began to flee toward Spokane. The Governor, 
realizing that he was losing the opportunity of ridding 
the county of the agitators unless he arrested them, 
declared martial laW. General Merriam proceeded to as-
sist the governor in the c:.rrest of all suspicious per-
sons. Arrests multiplied quickly. Fugitives escaped to 
Montana, but General Merriam very discreetly prevent-
ed his troops from crossing into a neighboring atate 
to seize 'the laWbreakers but left the matter to be set-
tled between the two governors. 
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Prisoners came in so fast that there were no 
accommodations for them. They were brought in cold 
and hungry and there was no food nor blankets. The 
troops, of course, were undergoing severe hardships 
at the same time. General Merriam protested against 
the herding of these prisoners into such uncomfort-
able and unsanitary quarters and urged the governor 
to make all has,te in the examination of those arrest-
ed. The Governor respon~ed and came down in person 
to carryon the work. 
The Governor had in the meantime, served a 
notice on all the mine owners of the district, by 
which, during the continuance of martial law, they 
were forbidden to employ miners unless they were able 
to present permits from state authorities. An elabor-
ate system for procuring these permits was provided. 
The proclamation was submitted to the General for 
approval and he suggested that a paragraph be insert-
ed providing that an applicant must first deny parti-
cipation in the riot of April 29, 1899, and s.econd, 
to deny or renounce membership in any society 'whioh 
partioipated in or incited the riot. This paragraph 
was embodied in the proclamation and the General 
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authorized his name to be printed on the bottom of 
the poster, under the words "examined and approved"_ 
This was the only connection that the military auth-
orities had With the proclamation- No attempt was made 
to participate in the issue or enforcing of the per-
mits. The General had merely approved the Governor's 
policy. Nevertheless, it did savor of military appro-
val of a question purely of policy. 
The labor unions quite naturally took excep-
tion to military sanction of an order which seemed to 
legislate against a union. They protested to Washing-
ton that miners in the Coeur d' Alene district are 
denied the right to employ men unless tbey make affi-
davits that they are non-union men and that the army 
is enfor~ing the order. To be sure, actual force was 
not being used but the moral force of the General's 
approval posted on the Governor's proclamation can-
not be denied. The General denied that affidavits 
were required, claimed that this, restriction applied 
only to the unions that participated in the riots 
and Was not an anti-union measure, and reiterated that 
troops were taking no part in this work. The telegram 
of May 31 from the secretary 'of War to the General 
has somewhat the tone cf-!& reprimand..... "'Use the 
United states troops to aid the state authorities 
simply to suppres.s rioting and to maintain peace and. 
order.... .. The army mus,t have nothing whatever to 
do With enforcing rules for the government of miners 
or miner's unions. ~hat is a matter for the local 
authorities to deal with." 
The reign of terror of wanton destruction 
of lives and property was considerably calmed by the 
arrival of troops, and the emergency 800n passed. The 
troops remained in the ,distriot until October 13. 
VIII. 
During the past twenty years the army haa 
been called upon more fr'equently than ever before to 
maintain law and order where civil authorities have 
failed. To be sure nothing of the magnitude of the 
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strikes of 1877 and 1894 have occurred but the calls 
have even more frequently come. The most~conspiouou. 
case, of course, was the San Francisoo earthquake in 
1905. General Funston of his own accord called out 
the troops and had them report to the Chief of Police. 
, I 
Here we have the case of eo military COlLmander who, 
\ 
faced-by a crisis, took matters in hand and was proper-
1. ly vindicated. "But for this action,' says the secre-
tary of War, Ithe oity would'soan have been in the . 
hands of thugs and 1ootersn~The army maintained order 
\ 
and administered relief to the greatest satisfaction. 
The work stands out as one of the most notable accom-
plishments of the army of the United states. 
Other emergencies have arisen during the past 
twenty years, but none involving new principles or 
unprecedented situations. The state militia and state 
constabularies have grown in strength and their mere 
appearance is begining to have somewhat the same 
moral effect as the presence of federal troops. The 
state constabulary of Pennsylvania is probably the 
best known in this respect. 
Since the close of the .uropean War the regu-
1. Report Secretary of War 1906 
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lar army has been kept constantly on the alert, ready 
to maintain peace in every troublesome region in the 
country. The reaSons for the restlessness and ellhibi-
tIona of lawlessness that have manifested themselves 
from time to time since November 1918 are many. We 
are not concerned with the causes. We must fact the 
facts and be prepared to prevent at any cost the wan-
ton destruction of property and the frequent loss of 
lives that accompany these outbursts of lawlessness • . 
No better conception of the extent to which the regu-
lar army has been called upon. to maintain order can 
be obtained than a consideration of the actual o&lls 
the federal troops answered. Let us consider the year 
1919-20 asa typical example. The following is a 
brief summary covering the use of federal troops in 
the establishment of law and order during that year 
1. and speaks for itself! 
July 1919 - Arizona- I.W.W. upriSing. 
WaShington, D.C.- race riots 
September - Omaha, Nebraska- race riots-
mob was on the point of 
hanging the city mayor. Ge~ 
eral Wood was called in and 
the city had to be put under 





Knoxvi1le, Tennessee; West Virginia.-
Coal strikes. 
GarYJ Indiana, ~ strike among steel 
worker&- General Wood called in 
again. Appearance of federal troops 
again restored order. 
Elaine, Arkansas- race riots. 
strikes in the following places or 
districts- Wyomingf Utah; Browns-
ville, Pennsylvania; Gallup, New 
Mexico; Bayne, Washington; Boga1us, 
Louisiana; Pittsburg, Kansas; and 
Mc~llister, Oklahoma. 




Lexington, Kentucky- negro . lynch-
ing. Montessamo, Washington- trial 
of persons charged w1 th murder 
of members of American Legion. 
Butte, Montana- strike. 
This list is not complete. Nor does it mention the 
cases where the National Guard or municipal police met 
, . 
the emergency. It shows that the germs of internal troub:-
les are, s.own in agricultural as well as in industrial 
centers, in the east as well as in the west, and no~th 
as well as south. A nation must be prepared to defend 




In considering the future size of the regular 
army this phase of preparedness must not be cverlook-
ed. Indications are that the call for troops will oc-
cur even more frequently in the future. We seem to be 
IOn the brink of a great labor uprising of which the 
ocal strike, the West VirginlA and Colorado troubles~ 
and the averted railroad strike are but the symptoms. 
Labor struggles alw_ys mean strikes and lockcuts ac-
companied by a oertain degree cf disorder which may 
suddenly take the form of a riot. The memory cf the 
railroad strikes of 1877 is s'till fresh in tne mi.nds 
of many Americans. 
The army will oontinue to be in the future as 
it has in the past, the main bulwark against lawless-
ness and terrcr; and in the future as in the past mil-
itary commanders will be called upcn to handle emer-
genoies which will require tact, force 'and human under-
standing. The situation of the army cfficer in case 
of internal troubles is at best a precarious one, --
placed as he is between a military oourt-martial on 
the one Side, and a oivil suit on the other. From the 
------------------------------------------------------
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cases we have considered his delicate situation has 
been emphasised again and again. At the bottom, how-
ever, we find one cardinal principle, which is well 
known to all military men, and is as applicable" to 
fighting foreign enemies as well as to guarding bridges. 
A soldier must be posit1ye in his attitude. First he 
must study the problem before him, then he must act. 
He may de¢ltie that the mere presence of troops will 
quell the uprising, he way feel that there is no need 
for intervention at all, or he may conclude that force 
to the utmost is necessary. He must,· however, decide 
upon some plan. Once having determined upon his plan 
of action he must see it through. Nothing so injures 
his prestige and consequently his ability to handle 
the situatIon as dilatory taotios, indefinite. plans, 
and constan~ changes of front. 
A study of the operation of martial law in 
this country mu~t lead to another conclusion, and 
that is the moral effect of the mere appearance of 
the regular army. Time and time again that alone 
sufficed to break up a riot and restore law and order. 
~here are many reasons for this. First and fo~emost 
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there is: the resp~,~t.. for the regular army so-ldier, his 
training and his ability to handle his weapons. Every 
school boy knows that "a regular can shootlt. Another 
reason is the. fact that the regular army. is recruited 
. 
from the country as a whole. A regiment of regulars ' 
called to perform riot duty in Chicago may have a doz-
en soldiers in its ranks to whom the city is anything 
more than a geographical acquaintance. On the other 
hand the local' police force and the national guard may 
be called upon to face not only neighbors and friends 
but even relatives. The result is obvious. The averq,ge 
American is a law-abiding person, and that is why the 
average disturbance can be ~andled by recourse to the 
local polioe system. When, however, an acute situa-
tion develops which requires ,xtreme measures, even to 
the extent of firing the average national guard com-
pany is. put in a very delicate position. The final re-
sort muat be the regula:;- army. 
Here too, is another point worth considering. 
The regular army is the final resort, to be sure, and 
should therefore only be called upon ,when all other 
means have failed. Furthermore, the responsibility 
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belpngs to the individual state, and there it should 
properly be ,lodged. Let each state develop its own 
police system-with a full knowledge that behind it 
there is a powerful support of regular army soldiers 
who will stand behind it and back it to the limit, 
but first it must learn to depend on itself. When 
everything else ha~ failed, and there are times·of 
such emergencies then, and then only, should the state 
appeal for federal aid. 
The regular army has not developed a manual 
for the handling of internal disturbances, and there 
is one of its chief virtues. Every case is complete'in 
itself. Thera is: nothing stereotyped as to what a mil-
itary commander should or should not "do. He merely 
knows thatnis initiative, tact, and ability as &, mil-
itary leader have been put to the test. The rest is 
with him. He may make himself hated by the very persons 
he is called upon to protect, or he may be a subject 
of admiration and respect by all factions. He may be 
hailea before a court, reprimanded and figed as was 
\ 
General Jackson; rebuked by his own superior as happen-
ad to General Merriam; or hailed by his country as a 
public hero as General Funston in the San Francisco 
earthquake. The matter is entirely 1n his own bands. 
On the whole it must be admitted that tbe American 
regular has met the test and has not been found want-
ing. 
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